Fair points there Taw, but I still do think the capture and/or destruction of targets of political importance are great for propaganda purposes. Y'know the old line "Yes, we have captured their seat of power and are now fighting the remaining pockets of resistance." The folks back home then think the war is all but won.
Still I wouldn't send troops into a city, to high a loss of life for the prize. Personally i'd just encircle the sucker and shell the crap out of it until they capitulated, or at least were weak enough to send in an attack with minimal resistance. As Patton once said, "fixed fortification are testament to the stupidity of man", you can always just walk around them.

well that's true, the capture of the capital is always important, as it usually send the enemy govt. packing, or capitulates. Not always. the Germans captured belgium early on in WW1, and occupied Bruxelles, but the Belgian King and Govt fought on as part of the Allies in that tiny nw corner of Belgium. I'm not talking of a govt in exile.

but this can be self-delusive. Xerxes captured Athens and burnt it, thought they'd won, but lost the war soon thereafter. The Byzantines took the Gothic capital Ravenna and thought they'd won, but couldn't defeat the Gothic army, but as long as they had the capital they claimed possession of Italy. Napoleon took Moscow and drove out the Tsar, thought he'd won, but his victory was illusory and short-lived. The Americans dashed for Baghdad and took it without too much of a fight, or at least not as much as everybody expected, and thought they'd won, but that was just the start of their woes.

while capturing the capital is great copy and sends a powerful signal to the enmy and to the home front, if the commanders and politicos start thinking that this means the enemy's beaten when they actually aren't, well that's just asking for trouble. Which is why my plan goes by the maxim of avoiding urban concentrations altogether unless operationally necessary, in order to deal with the enemy's field forces first. Then turn on the cities. They can be screened with blocking forces if necessary to prevent any intereference with main lines of advance. I wouldn't even soften them up with artillery except to scare them. Go into the capital after the surrender.

a what if? scenario. in 1945 the Allies got to withtin a 100miles of Berlin on the R Elbe, some time before the Russians did, as what German defence there was had been holding up the Russian advance at the Seelow hills e of the City. Churchill, despite his earlier undertaking to Stalin, pressed Eisenhower for a rapid advance to encircle the city and prevent Hitler from escaping. But not to take it.

this made a lot of sense. The Germans were effectively ceasing operations against the Allies, who by now were roaming q freely across W Germany, and turning eastward to engage the Russians. There were still several large formations in existence, having disengaged from the Americans and British. A rapid Allied advance which was still possible despite the lengthened communications and supply lines, could q possibly without any serious interfernce from the remaining German forces, have screend Berlin from the Russians. The capital was of no military significance at this stage, Hitler's insane orders were being ignored by almost every unit oitside of Berlin, even by SS battalions. Its only significance was symbolic and the presence of Hitler himself. How long would he have lasted, with no troops outside the allied cordon to command because they were ignoring him or surrrendering to the Americans, and no Russian assault? he'd have shot himself anyway, as his remaining forces and citizen defenders ran off to give themselves up to the Allies, rather than desp fight the Russians to the bitter end.

it wasnt i think that Eisenhower and his masters were scared of Allied casualties; they were canny enough to see that they could largely avoid that. A rough plan of what i described above was suggested. it was rather that they felt they had to stick to te deals done with Stalin on the partition of Germany, and that Stalin wanted Hitler as a prize. Some cynics would say that it was also to weaken the Russian Army, as casualties for Berlin would be, and indeed were, enormous.

Edited by - Radio Free Tawakalnistan on 9/6/2004 5:36:19 PM

Point about Moscow.... Neither Napoleon nor Hitler actually took Moscow. Never had a place in which they could winter. To that end, Moscow could have been important as far as logistics and weather was concerned.

I thought 'Boney did get to Moscow, but the Russians burnt it and he had to evacuate, 'cos it was worthless. No supplies, no shelter, nada. And weren't the French surprised and impressed by the classical architecture (before it got burnt) and at how European looking the city was?

D'oh! You're right. I just remembered that he had no Moscow in which to winter.

I've really got to find that gingko biloba before I start forgetting where I put my wallet.

*suddenly panicks and starts searching through laundry hamper*

Two "great" warlords, twice the same mistake, although "Boney" didn't really wage a war on two fronts at the same time.

What human being, in his sane mind would risk open war with a country thats larger then europe alltogether, and what stretches from the outer edges of Europe to the Bering Strait, crossing the polar circle?? and even unprepared at that?? Bonapartes biggest mistake was that he forgot to pack winter shoes and warm clothing. He "Reckoned" the Russians weren't all so foolish and just evacuate and leave the cities intact for him to take residence, undersized Git that he was

*phew* i actually thought i might be wrong then. you had me q convinced I'd misunderstood all these years, Ed.

(can you still remember how to get home? do you want me to send you a map?)

Edited by - Radio Free Tawakalnistan on 9/6/2004 7:01:21 PM

Yes. Please do. I can't seem to find New Dworkia in any atlases around here.

that's because it got changed to New Tawakalnagrad; you've just forgotten, along with everything else it seems.

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Bonapartes biggest mistake was that he forgot to pack winter shoes and warm clothing.

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Seems to be a common mistake, Hitler did the same in the Moscow offensive. Even Bradley screwed the pooch by thinking the war would be over quicker than expected and didn't allow for frosty weather in the Ardennes.

yes it's a not uncommon phenomena, isn't it? and afflicts not only ruthless dictators but brilliant men of destiny and capable generals. Bradley was of course the "GI" general who often shared his troops risks.

why does it happen? partly overconfidence, esp when you're on a roll, and also psychologically; there's always in every war a pressure, indeed a desire, for it "to be all over by Christmas" in a quick campaign. And indeed on all those 3 occasions you would at the time have been convinced that it was all but over, and with good reason (you'd have been wrong though)

Napoleon as we've seen actually captured Moscow but it was burnt by the Russians. 'Boney had to evacuate and trudge back home through devastated lands, losing most of his huge army in the process. Like many conquerors, he also came to believe that a trimphant victory march through the enemy capital meant that he had actually won and the enemy would give up now, pay reparations, swap some territory, set up some nominée ruler, and everybody would go back home.

Hitler nearly captured Moscow, but started Brabarossa too late, despite the late thaw that year. His constant dilettante interferance with operations caused confusion and delay. He fell short of Moscow pretty much by the delay he'd caused by himself. However even if he had taken Moscow and in good order, it's doubtful that would have been the end of the Soviet war effort.

Bradley, and his superior Eisenhower, genuinely believed the Germans were all but beaten. No-one expected any sort of offensive operations from the Germans, esp not in the winter in the Ardennes, and in almost complete secrecy. It should be noted that there was a fair bit of resistance to an last-ditch offensive amongst German commanders who saw clearly that it was militarily futile, and could only hasten the end, which od course it did. So Bradley came to the same conclusions as his German opposite numbers, but Hitler's "strategy" was by then devoid of any reason or common-sense.

Patton and his Third Army, while coming up from the South where it was just
miserably rainy throughout the Fall had heavy trench coats, etc., already issued to his men.

Of course, Ike hated Patton. I think Bradley respected him but I don't think he really liked Patton.

Patton was a general of great insight and ability, Ike should have listened to him more. Ike was too busy playing politics and keeping everyone happy. If he'd given Old Blood n Guts free rein after D-Day, instead of relying on Montgomery, or eschewed the Market garden fiasco in favour of a push to the Rhine, the war prob would have been over by Christmas.

Agreed, Patton's only failing was that he couldn't play the political game. Monty's stuffing around at Caen and Market Garden lost far to much time and far to many lives. Should've never happened.